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TITLE IX AND THE OUTER LIMITS OF
THE SPENDING POWERS
Grove City College v. Bell
104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984)
BEVERLY BRANDT TIESENGA*
INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental maxims of equity is that for every legal
wrong there is a remedy. I In some instances, however, there may even be
a "remedy" where no wrong has occurred. In what has been termed a
"blind pursuit of social perfection,"' 2 one federal civil rights agency has
been charged with vindicating sprawling social goals at the expense of
private autonomy in the complete absence of any actual discrimination.
3
One of the most controversial decisions of the 1983 Supreme Court
term illustrates this situation. In Grove City College v. Bell,4 the Court
found that certain federal grants to less than 10% of the college's stu-
dents constituted "federal financial assistance" sufficient to draw the pri-
vate college's entire financial aid program within the regulatory control
of Title IX,5 and implicitly within the interests of the Department of
Education. 6 In that decision, the Supreme Court attempted to merge
two major competing interests-private higher education's struggle to re-
main autonomous and the broad remedial goals of anti-discrimination
laws.
This comment will examine the validity of subjecting private entities
to federal control through the untoward link of Congress' spending pow-
* J.D., IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1985.
1. 4 J.N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Vol. II § 363 (5th ed., 1941).
2. Hearings on the Civil Rights Policy in Grove City before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (statement of George Roche,
President, Hillsdale College).
3. Hearings on the Civil Rights Policy in Grove City before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (statement of Charles Fried,
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School).
4. 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
5. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982). Title IX has two objectives: first, to prevent the use of federal
funds to support discriminatory practices; and second, to provide individuals effective protection
against these practices. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
6. 104 St. Ct. at 1222.
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ers.7 The comment will then address the Supreme Court's effort to re-
solve the tension between Title IX's broad anti-discrimination goals and
its narrow statutory enforcement provisions through Title IX's program-
specific language.
Finally, this comment will address the impact of Grove City on the
lower courts as well as on the legislature, where Congress has already
attempted to use that decision as an invitation to rewrite current civil
rights laws to encompass a virtually limitless spectrum of private activi-
ties. This comment will conclude that unsolicited funds which happen to
trace back to a federal source should not be considered "federal financial
assistance" for purposes of Title IX coverage when the affected educa-
tional institution has sought to minimize federal involvement. In addi-
tion, the reach of legislation containing program-specific language, such
as Title IX, should be limited to only that program or activity which
directly solicits and receives federal money.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In general, the federal government has been reluctant to interfere in
matters of curriculum, admissions, personnel policies, and other seg-
ments of higher education. 8 Where the government has taken steps to
intervene in the educational process, those steps have been taken with
caution to avoid infringement on other constitutional interests poten-
tially at stake.9 After much debate, one such piece of legislation, Title
IX,1° was enacted to protect participants in federally financed educa-
tional programs from sex discrimination. In order to fall within the
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
8. See generally, O'Neil, God and Government at Yale: The Limits of Federal Regulation of
Higher Education, 44 U. CINN. L. REV. 525, 526 (1975). The author identifies five historical factors
which catalyzed a higher degree of government involvement in colleges. These include: 1) the dra-
matic growth of governmental support of higher education at rates which exceeded student enroll-
ment; 2) campus disruption of the late 1960's and early 1970's; 3) mounting concern over the quality
and value of higher education; 4) financial crisis among many private colleges and universities as a
result of rising inflation and dwindling enrollments; and 5) the under-representation of women and
minorities in higher educational institutions. Id. at 527.
9. O'Neil, Private Universities and Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 155 (1970). See also,
National Defense Education Act of 1958, 20 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. (1982) Pub. L. No. 85-864, where
Congress promised worried educators that ". . . nothing contained in the Act will be construed to
authorize any department, agency, officer, or employee of the United States to exercise any direction,
supervision, or control over the curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or personnel of
any educational institution." Title I § 102. The programs under section 401, however, have not
been amended for a number of years.
10. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982), Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373.
11. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982) states in pertinent part: "No person in the United States shall,
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
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jurisdiction of this statute, an educational institution must receive federal
financial assistance.'
2
Section 902 of Title IXt3 contains enforcement provisions which en-
able federal departments and agencies distributing financial assistance to
issue rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability consistent with
the objectives of the authorizing statute. This section also permits sanc-
tions for non-compliance, including termination of the financial aid to a
non-compliant recipient. Section 902 is commonly referred to as the
"pinpoint regulation"' 4 because it limits the reach of the enforcement
provisions to the discriminating program.
A. Financial Assistance
In order to interpret the Grove City decision, it is necessary to un-
derstand the meanings of two important terms, "federal financial assist-
ance" and "program or activity," within the context of Title IX. Only a
few courts have addressed the issue of what constitutes "federal financial
assistance" for Title IX purposes.' 5 Two conflicting lines of reasoning
have developed in these ,cases.
One line of cases takes a broad view and suggests that "federal finan-
cial assistance" encompasses any federal aid that can ultimately be traced
back to discriminatory conduct by the institution. For example, in
Dougherty County School System v. Harris,16 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated in dicta that federal money used to
defray the salaries of elementary and secondary school teachers was suffi-
cient to establish federal financial assistance to the school under Title
IX. 17
12. Id.
13. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1982).
14. Board of Public Instruction of Taylor County, Florida v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1075 (5th
Cir. 1969).
15. North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982); Dougherty County School
System v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub nom. Bell v. Dougherty
County School System, 456 U.S. 986 (1982); Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 445
(5th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1102 (1982); Bennett v. West Texas State Univer-
sity, 525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 698 F.2d 1215 (5th Cir. 1983); Haffer v. Temple
University of Com. System, 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Board,
507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981), afl'd on other grounds, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983). Com-
mentators uniformly agree that there is little information in the legislative history which is of much
help on this issue. See, e.g., Cox, Intercollegiate Athletics and Title IX, 46 GEORGE WASH. L. REV.
34, 36 (1977); Comment, HEWs Regulations Under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972:
Ultra Vires Challenges, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 133.
16. 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded sub. nom. Bell v. Dougherty County
School System, 456 U.S. 986 (1982).
17. Id. at 738. The Dougherty court was also careful to point out that Title IX only applies to
those programs receiving financial assistance.
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Later, in Iron Arrow Honor Society v. Schweiker,t8 the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals expanded its reading of financial assistance to include
indirect aid. In that case, an all-male honor society received no federal
funds but did have its postage fees and certain secretarial services paid
for by the university.' 9 On remand, the Iron Arrow court found that the
discriminatory practices of the all-male society had tainted every univer-
sity activity through indirect federal financial assistance to other school
programs.
20
Similarly, in Haffer v. Temple University of Com. System, 2' the court
found that over $19 million in federal funds used to support over ten
percent of the university's budget constituted federal financial assistance
to that entire university. The Haffer court did not analyze whether this
was "direct" or "indirect" financial assistance, presumably because the
size of the federal aid package was so large. 22 Consequently, Haffer left
open the issue of how substantial the federal financial assistance must be
before Title IX will apply.
23
In contrast, a second line of cases takes a much stricter view of "fed-
eral financial assistance" under Title IX. This view is illustrated by
Othen v. Ann Arbor School Board,24 where the district court held that
Title IX applied only to the specific class of educational programs or
activities which receive direct federal financial assistance. 25 The court
also relied on the "pinpoint" enforcement provisions to find that Title IX
applied only to direct recipients of financial assistance. 26
Likewise, in Bennett v. West Texas State University,27 female under-
graduate athletes sued the university for alleged Title IX violations. The
court granted summary judgment for the university because the univer-
sity's athletic program itself received no federal funding.28
18. 652 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded, 458 U.S. 1102 (1982).
19. Id. at 447-48.
20. 499 F. Supp. 496, affd sub. noma., 652 F.2d 445 (5th Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1102
(1982), affid sub. noma., 702 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1983).
21. 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
22. For instance, federal college work study monies were paid to over 80% of the intercollegi-
ate athletic program employees, "several hundred thousand dollars" were spent each year on federal
financial aid to the school's intercollegiate athletes, and the intercollegiate athletic program made
direct use of campus buildings financed with federal funds. Id. at 540.
23. The court rejected the direct/indirect funding distinction, but inferred that the federal fi-
nancial assistance must be more than a de minimus portion of the school's annual revenues, citing
Stewart v. New York University, 430 F. Supp. 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
24. 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
25. Id. at 1381 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 1382.
27. 525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
28. Id. at 81.
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Similarly, in University of Richmond v. Bell, 29 a private university
sought to enjoin a Department of Education investigation of the univer-
sity's athletic program. The district court granted the injunction on the
grounds that the athletic department was not a recipient of direct federal
financial aid. 30 The court based its decision on the Supreme Court's re-
cent holding in North Haven Board of Education v. Bell,31 which held
that the Department of Education's regulations apply only to programs
or activities that receive or benefit from federal financial assistance.
32
According to the rule set out in North Haven, the federal financial assist-




A second and related issue among these same Title IX cases is "pro-
gram specificity," or the question of which entities within the institution
are governed by a "federal financial assistance" finding. In the past, cer-
tain courts have reached opposite results when faced with the task of
untangling the affected educational entities from the unaffected ones.
34
On one side of the debate, the Department of Education (DOE) has
taken the position that when an educational institution receives federal
money for one of its programs, the entire institution falls under the gov-
ernance of Title IX.
3 5
Conversely, advocates of the program-specific view believe that the
"pinpoint" enforcement provisions found in sections 901 and 902 of Title
29. 543 F. Supp. 321 (E.D. Va. 1982).
30. Id. at 333.
31. 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
32. Id. at 536.
33. Id. at 536-40. It has been urged that the Court in North Haven left open the possibility that
a federal agency may terminate federal aid even when there is an indirect connection between the aid
and the discrimination. See, e.g., Note, Civil Rights-Title IX Applies to Non-earmarked, General-
use Federal Financial Aid as Well as to Earmarked Aid, 56 TEMP. L.Q. 605, 626 (1983). However,
this reasoning seems inconsistent with the narrow view the Court took in defining affected programs
or activities in North Haven, 456 U.S. at 540.
34. Several courts have resorted to a strict programmatic approach. See, e.g., Hillsdale College
Department v. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 696 F.2d 418 (6th Cir.), vacated and
remanded, 104 S. Ct. 1673 (1982); Rice v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336
(1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928 (1982); University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321
(E.D. Va. 1982); Othen v. Ann Arbor School Board, 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (aff'd as
to attorney's fees, 699 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1983)). At least two lower courts have found support for a
much broader institution-wide approach. Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3rd Cir. 1982);
Haffer v. Temple University of Com. System, 524 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
35. See, e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). Although the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) argued that civil rights coverage should be institution-
wide, the Bob Jones case is factually distinguishable because it involved admittedly discrimnatory
admissions policies which affected the entire university.
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IX support a narrow construction in which only specific institutional
sub-units found to discriminate are subject to Title IX penalties.
36
In one of the earliest cases to discuss program-specificity, the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Board of Public Instruction of Taylor
County, Florida v. Finch,37 held that nearly identical funding provisions
in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were directed only at the
programs or activities engaging in the prohibited conduct.38 More re-
cently, in a case almost identical to the Grove City case, the court in
Hillsdale College v. Department of Health, Education and Welfare
39
found that it would be inconsistent to terminate all federal student aid
under Title IX to a college which discriminated only in a particular pro-
gram. 40 The majority of courts have upheld this program-specific
interpretation.
41
DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT
Grove City College is a private coeducational liberal arts college lo-
cated in Grove City, Pennsylvania. About 140 of Grove City's 2200 stu-
dents were receiving Basic Educational Opportunity Grants (BEOG's)
and 340 students were receiving Guaranteed Student Loans (GSL's) at
the time the lawsuit was filed.42 Grove City College strictly minimized
its association with the government by participating in the Department
of Education's Alternate Disbursement System (ADS) which allowed the
Department to calculate the financial aid award and make disbursements
directly to the student. 43 Other than the possible exception of this finan-
cial aid plan, Grove City established an affirmative policy of refusing all
forms of government assistance in order to remain independent of gov-
36. See 117 CONG. REC. 30156 (1971) (Senator Bayh, the main sponsor of Title IX, pressed for
an amendment which would adopt an institutional approach. This amendment was defeated as non-
germane to the bill).
37. 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969).
38. Id. at 1075.
39. 696 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1982).
40. Id. at 428.
41. Rice v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 663 F.2d 336 (Ist Cir. 1981); Dougherty
City School System v. Bell, 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980), on remand, 694 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1982);
Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1981); University of Richmond v. Bell, 543 F. Supp. 321
(E.D. Va. 1982); Bennett v. West Texas State University, 525 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
42. Grove City v. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
43. Institutions participating in the ADS program must make certain certifications to the De-
partment that the designated student is enrolled at the school and that the school will comply with
the requirements of Title IX. Under the Regular Disbursement System (RDS), the Department
estimates the amount of money an institution will need for grants and that sum is then sent directly
to the institution. The school then selects grant recipients and advances the calculated grants to
them.
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ernment entanglement.44
In July of 1977, the Secretary of the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare45 (HEW) requested that Grove City execute form
639A, "Assurance of Compliance with Title IX," as required by depart-
ment regulations. 46 Failure to execute the form would result in termina-
tion of matriculating students' BEOG and GSL funds. The College
objected to this requirement, contending that it was not a recipient of
federal financial assistance and that HEW's regulations exceeded the
scope of sections 901 and 902 of Title IX. 4 7 At the HEW compliance
proceeding which followed, the administrative law judge (ALJ), some-
what reluctantly, ruled in favor of HEW, stating that as an ALJ he had
no authority to rule on the constitutionality or statutory validity of the
department's regulations. 48 The ALJ emphasized, however, that "there
was not the slightest hint of any failure to comply with Title IX save the
refusal to submit an executed assurance of compliance. '49
The college, along with four students who were not parties to the
administrative proceeding, filed suit in federal district court, seeking to
have the order of the HEW Secretary declared null and void. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment in favor of Grove City and held
that although the college was covered by Title IX via its BEOG partici-
pation,50 "only upon a showing of actual discrimination" 5' involving stu-
dent programs at the College could federal assistance be terminated.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed, holding that
both direct and indirect aid triggered Title IX.52 Thus, the Department
44. 104 S. Ct. at 1223 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring).
45. HEW's functions under Title IX were transferred in 1979 to the Department of Education
(DOE). Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 678, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3441(a)(2)(D) (1982).
46. 34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (1981). The regulation reads in pertinent part:
(a) General: Every application for Federal financial assistance for any education pro-
gram or activity shall as a condition of its approval contain or be accompanied by an
assurance from the applicant to recipient, satisfactory to the Assistant Secretary, that each
education program or activity operated by the applicant or recipient and to which this part
applies will be operated in compliance with this part.
34 C.F.R. § 106.4 (1981).
47. 500 F. Supp. 253, 255 (quoting Judge Feldman, In the Matter of Grove City College, docket
no. A-22, p. 9 (HEW Administrative Proceeding, Sept. 15, 1978)).
48. Id.
49. Id. Administrative Law Judge Feldman wrote, "There is, very clearly, given to the Direc-
tor total and unbridled discretion to require any certificate of compliance that he may desire ...
There are no guidelines. There is no necessary continuity, as from one Director to a successor
Director whose opinions as to what constituted compliance might be totally different from those of
his predecessor." Id.
50. Id. at 260. GSL participation was exempted from Title IX coverage because GSL's were
considered contracts of guaranty.
51. Id. at 261.
52. 687 F.2d 684, 700 (3rd Cir. 1982).
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could terminate grants to Grove City's students even though the Depart-
ment had not proven that there had been any discrimination. In addi-
tion, the Court of Appeals held that the entire institution was governed
by Title IX under the program specific language of the statute. 53
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 54 to decide whether Grove
City was a "recipient" of federal financial assistance, and if so, whether
the entire institution could be brought within the ambit of Title IX.
THE COURT'S DECISION
The majority opinion, written by Justice White, first held that Title
IX coverage is triggered when any of the college's students receive
BEOG's to pay for their educational expenses. 55 Thus student BEOG's,
even under the ADS plan, constituted "federal financial assistance"
within the meaning of Title IX.56 The Court was reluctant, however, to
construe section 901(a) narrowly. 57 Lacking any substantive legislative
history on the intended meaning of "federal financial assistance" in sec-
tion 901(a), the Court resorted to interpretations of similar provisions in
other statutes, such as Title VI, which at one time had been broadly con-
strued to support a similar conclusion.58
Second, because the receipt of BEOG's by some students repre-
sented financial assistance only to the college's financial aid program, the
Court held that only that program may be regulated by Title IX.59 The
Court looked to the language of the statute authorizing benefit termina-
tion to determine what was meant by program-specificity. According to
the Court, that language was so ambiguous that the majority was only
willing to extend Title IX coverage to the financial aid office, even though
those funds eventually reached the college's general operating budget. 6°
Third, the Court held that the Department may terminate federal
aid to the college's financial aid program for its refusal to execute a pro-
53. Id. See generally, Note, Discrimination: The Remedial Scope of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, as Interpreted in Grove City College and Richmond University, 36 OKLA. L.
REv. 710 (1983).
54. 459 U.S. 1199 (1983).
55. 104 S. Ct. at 1220-21.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1217. Section 901(a) of Title IX states in pertinent part: "No person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex... be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . .." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
58. 104 S. Ct. at 1218-19. See, e.g., Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979);
Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967);
Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
59. 104 S. Ct. at 1222.
60. Id. at 1221.
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gram-specific assurance of compliance, regardless of any finding as to
actual discrimination. 61 Finally, the Court rejected the argument that
these Title IX compliance requirements violated the first amendment
rights of the college or its students.
62
In a concurring opinion,63 Justices Powell, Burger, and O'Connor
criticized the federal agency for bringing this "overzealous" enforcement
action.64 Impressed with the ALJ's "no discrimination" finding, the con-
currence questioned the efficacy of terminating financial aid of needy stu-
dents for the sole purpose of vindicating the changing political views of
the Department.
65
Justice Stevens, in a separate concurring opinion, 66 accused the ma-
jority of rendering an "advisory opinion" on the hypothetical coverage of
Title IX. He stated: "[T]here is no reason for the Court to hold that
Grove City need not make a promise that the Secretary does not ask it to
make, and that it in fact would not be making by signing the Assurance,
in order to continue to receive federal financial assistance."
'67
Justices Brennan and Marshall based their dissent 68 on an interpre-
tation of the "broad sweep" of Title IX. Arguing for institution-wide
coverage, the dissent charged that "the Court's narrow definition of 'pro-
gram or activity' is directly contrary to congressional intent" 69 and "has
unjustifiably limited the statute's reach."' 70 Fearing that the Court's
holding now leaves Grove City "free to discriminate in other 'programs
or activities' operated by the institution," 7' the dissent warned that the
Court was now implicitly sanctioning discriminatory practices. 72 Justice
Brennan specifically criticized the Court for accommodating the execu-
tive branch's policy shift made midway through this litigation.
73
61. Id. at 1223.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1223 (Powell, J., Burger, C.J., and O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 1223.
65. "One would have thought that the Department, confronted as it is with cases of national
importance that involve actual discrimination, would have respected the independence and admira-
ble record of this college. But common sense and good judgment failed to prevail." Id. at 1224.
66. Id. at 1225-26.
67. Id. at 1225. But see, majority's comment at 1220 n.20.
68. Id. at 1227 and 1235.
69. Id. at 1227.
70. Id. at 1235.
71. Id. at 1236.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1236. The Grove City litigation spanned the tenure of four Secretaries of HEW who
were responsible for administering BEOG's: Joseph Califano, Patricia Roberts Harris, Shirley Huf-
stedler, and Terrel Bell. The Department of Education was later split from HEW pursuant to Pub.
L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 677, 678 (1979). The government's position within the Department of Educa-
tion shifted under the Reagan Administration.
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ANALYSIS
The Grove City Court held that a private college's indirect receipt of
federal funds brings its specific recipient programs under Title IX scru-
tiny. This holding is based on two interdependent issues: federal finan-
cial assistance and program specificity.
A. Financial Assistance
Numerous theories have been advanced as standards for identifying
the ultimate beneficiaries of federal aid. 74 These theories, in turn, are
used to ascertain the boundaries of federal regulatory power. The under-
lying question is whether it is constitutional to permit federal agencies to
track all federal dollars into the private sector in order to compel compli-
ance with broad social goals.
The power to subsidize frequently becomes the power to regulate
that which is subsidized; that is, the power to encourage or discourage
certain forms of behavior. 75 In this vein, several citizens groups have
criticized the Grove City decision on the grounds that it is a contradiction
to spend for the national welfare without the power to impose extensive
conditions on that money to achieve those goals, such as the elimination
of sex discrimination in education.
76
In general, the Congressional authority to spend is much more ex-
tensive than its authority to regulate. Congressional regulation is consti-
tutionally limited by Article 1, 77 but the spending powers have no
74. See, e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (direct/indirect dichot-
omy); North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982) (benefit theories); Board of
Public Instruction of Taylor County, Florida v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068, 1078-79 (5th Cir. 1969) (in-
fection theories); and Note, Civil Rights-Title IX Applies to Non-earmarked, General-use Federal
Financial Aid As Well As to Earmarked Aid, 56 TEMP. L.Q. 605 (1983) (use theories).
75. O'Neil, God and Government at Yale: The Limits of Federal Regulation of Higher Educa-
tion, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 525, 527-28 (1975).
76. Hearings on the Civil Rights Policy in Grove City before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong., 21d Sess. (1984) (statement of Marcia Green-
berger, Spokesperson, National Women's Law Center). ("Millions of women pay taxes into the
Federal treasury and we collectively resent that these funds should be used for the support of institu-
tions to which we are denied equal access." Quoting Rep. Patsy Mink, 118 CONG. REC. 5806-5807
(1972)).
77. U.S. CONST. Art. I. § 8, cl. 3-18. "The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States .... Id. cl. 1. In United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), the Court
held that the general welfare clause does not grant Congress power to provide for the general welfare
by any means it chooses. Instead, the general welfare clause confers only a power to spend; it does
not confer any independent power to regulate. 297 U.S. at 64. Under the Butler analysis, Congress
could not command a coercive purchase of compliance though it could appropriate funds condi-
tioned on the undertaking of certain acts. See generally, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 247-50 (1978).
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comparable restrictions.78 Congress, however, has successfully circum-
vented this clear constitutional mandate by adding "conditions" to fed-
eral grants.79 In a frequently quoted commerce clause case, Justice
Roberts warned that "the power to confer or withhold unlimited benefits
is the power to coerce or destroy.
' '80
Consequently, conditions imposed on federal aid grants must bear
some reasonable relationship to the purpose of the spending power.
Otherwise, plans like the BEOG program may become merely schemes
for purchasing federal regulation of a subject properly reserved to the
states. "The Congress cannot invade State jurisdiction to compel indi-
vidual action; no more can it purchase such action."81 It follows then,
that the "integrity of the federal purse" is jeopardized when federal funds
are withdrawn without any evidence of constitutional or national policy
violations.
In holding that BEOG funds are federal financial assistance, the
Grove City Court looked for support in the legislative history of the Edu-
cation Amendments of 197282 and found that BEOG funds were "one of
the primary components of Congress' comprehensive 'package of federal
aid' to post-secondary education.
'8 3
The Court also rejected any distinctions between direct and indirect
aid, relying instead on its recent expansive definition of financial assist-
ance in Bob Jones University v. United States,8 4 and the broad purposes
underlying Title IX itself.85 At the same time, in the second part of the
Grove City decision, the Court was forced to look for restraints on this
wide open door of "financial assistance" and did so by interpreting the
78. The federal government is one of delegated powers only under the Tenth Amendment.
None of those delegated powers authorizes Congress to legislate for the national welfare. THE FED-
ERALIST PAPERS No. 41 at 283-84 (J. Madison). (E. Bourne, ed. 1937) (explaining that the power to
legislate for the general welfare is a qualification on the tax power-not a general grant of legislative
power). The regulation of matters not enumerated in the Constitution is reserved to the States... or
to the people." U.S. CONST. AMEND. X.
79. Child Nutrition Amendments of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1751 (1982) (national school lunch
money cannot be spent on textbooks); Aid to Families with Dependent Children Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 601 et seq. (1982) (funds may be disbursed only to those families which meet specified income
standards); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1982) (federal funds may
be withheld from any program or activity which is discriminatorily administered). See generally,
Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1595 (1960).
80. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 71 (1936).
81. Id. at 73. The Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment protects against arbitrary or
capricious government action. This constitutional guarantee demands that the means selected
should have a real and substantial relationship to the selected ends. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
82. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. (1982), Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (1972).
83. Grove City, 104 S. Ct. at 1217, quoting 117 CONG. REC. 30412 (1971) (Sen. Pell). See also,
C. FINN, SCHOLARS, DOLLARS, AND BUREAUCRATS 124-25 (1978).
84. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
85. See generally, North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982).
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statute to apply only to particular programs or activities which directly
benefited from the financial assistance.8 6 The Court did not accept
Grove City's argument that the federal financial aid was aimed at aiding
poor students rather than poor universities,8 7 because the student aid
provisions included the broad purpose of providing "assistance to institu-
tions of higher education."1
88
Yet the Court was not forced to conclude that student educational
grants are financial assistance to the school. 89 The plain meaning of "stu-
dent aid" implies that federal financial assistance for education is
designed to give financially needy students an opportunity to obtain a
college or advanced degree. By terminating federal money to a qualified
student who happens to attend a "noncomplying" institution, the De-
partment primarily punishes the student rather than the institution.90
HEW relied heavily on its own regulations to support its position on
the financial assistance issue. The interpretation of these regulations,
however, has vacillated through the years to include expanding and con-
tracting definitions of that term. 91 Under these circumstances, HEW's
86. Grove City, 104 S. Ct. at 1222-23.
87. Id. at 1217-18 n.13.
88. Id. at 1218, citing 20 U.S.C. § 1070(a)(3), Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 381. The Court also
placed heavy emphasis for its financial assistance finding on the acquiescence of Congress during the
post-enactment history of Title IX. 104 S. Ct. at 1219 n. 19. See also, "Sex Discrimination Regula-
tions Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Post-Secondary Education of the House Commission on
Education and Labor," 121 CONG. REc. 482-84 (1975). Still, the legislative acquiescence argument
proves too much because mere acquiescence is not conclusive evidence of legislative intent. See, e.g.,
Othen v. Ann Arbor School Board, 507 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Mich. 1981), in which the court explic-
itly rejected the "omission to act" theory of determining legislative intent of Title IX financial assist-
ance provisions. Id. at 1383 n.8. In Othen, the court concluded that Congressional inaction should
not be construed as approval particularly with respect to failure to renounce agency regulations. Id.
Likewise, the Supreme Court has concluded that where an agency's regulations conflict with the
language of the statute, the regulations promulgated thereunder are no longer entitled to deference.
North Haven, 456 U.S. 512, 522 n.12 (1982). This reasoning is especially applicable where the
agency's interpretations of its own regulations are inconsistent. Id.
89. In O'Connor v. Peru State College, 605 F. Supp. 753 (D. Neb. 1985), a women's basketball
coach and physical education instructor challenged her discharge from State College employment.
In dismissing her Title IX claim the district court held that the Penn State College physical educa-
tion division was not a recipient of direct federal funds. Id. at 760. Although the physical education
program did receive Title III research project grants, the trial court found that those funds would
only mandate the college's Title IX compliance in the selection and funding distributions of those
projects. Id. at 761. ("[T]he mere fact that one or more of the projects submitted might have in-
volved the Physical Education Division would not be sufficient to bring the entire athletic program
within the purview of Title IX, absent any direct Federal funding to physical education programs.")
Id.
90. Granted, the school also suffers if students leave to attend "complying" institutions, but the
decline in enrollment would not be as significant as the effect on a certain group of needy applicants
who might be financially precluded from attending an "independent" college. See Statement of
Bruce C. Hafen, President, American Association of Presidents of Independent Colleges and Univer-
sities before the U.S. Comm. on Civil Rights, January 10, 1985.
91. See Grove City, 104 S. Ct. at 1216 n.10 (1984).
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regulations deserved less than the traditional deference given administra-
tive law. The Court should have looked instead to the practical functions
served by student grants and concluded that Grove City had received no
federal financial assistance.
By analogy, "indirect" educational assistance in the form of benefits
to students or their families has recently been distinguished from "di-
rect" benefits to schools in the context of aid to parochial schools. 92 This
is true even though the financial assistance to parents ultimately has eco-
nomic effects comparable to that of aid given directly to the schools at-
tended by their children. In addition, student recipients of BEOG grants
are allowed to spend that money for a variety of education-related ex-
penses, including off-campus housing and meals. Consequently, it is not
necessarily true that ADS student funds eventually wind up in the col-
lege's financial aid program, much less its general operating budget.
In short, the Court was not compelled to hold that Grove City was a
recipient of "federal financial assistance" simply because the legislative
history did not distinguish between direct and indirect aid recipients.
93
Yet, by so holding, the Court avoided the harder course of determining
how tangential federal aid must be before it is not considered "federal
financial assistance."
B. Program Specificity
Unlike the federal assistance issue, the Grove City Court did reach a
proper, rational result with respect to the program-specificity issue. De-
spite the Department's vigorous arguments to the District Court in favor
of institution-wide coverage94 the Court held that the statute's program-
specific enforcement provisions, sections 901 and 902, limited the De-
partment's regulatory powers to the programs or activities receiving the
assistance.95 Under the facts of Grove City, BEOG funds were
earmarked for the recipient's financial aid program96 even though these
funds may eventually be distributed throughout the college to cover any
number of institutional costs. According to the Court, student financial
aid programs are sui generis and the Department's regulatory authority
92. See e.g. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (parents' state tax deductions for parochial
school expenses held constitutional).
93. 104 S. Ct. at 1218. There is no reference to "indirect" federal financial assistance in the
legislative history. As Justice Brennan aptly pointed out, "For every instance in which a legislator
equated the word 'program' with a particular grant statute, there is an example of a legislator defin-
ing 'program or activity' more broadly." Id. at 1229.
94. 500 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
95. 104 S. Ct. at 1222.
96. Id. at 1221.
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does not "follow federally aided students from classroom to classroom,
building to building, or activity to activity."
'97
This portion of the Court's holding has been severely criticized on
the grounds that it unjustifiably restricts the intended scope of Title IX.98
Under this view, longstanding administrative interpretations of Title VI
and Title IX and evidence of more expansive congressional intent should
have been accorded greater deference. 99 The decision has also prompted
civil rights activists to paint bleak scenarios in which federal funds may,
for example, be used to build a college library but the school's athletics
programs and science departments would escape Title IX scrutiny.1°°
Such reasoning is based, however, on the assumption that federal
subsidy should be equated with limitless federal control. Under this ap-
proach, the goal of crafting a remedy proportionate to the harm gives
way when the broad purposes behind the civil rights legislation are at
stake. Still, when the basis of civil rights enforcement no longer requires
state action and actual discrimination, but instead is based on accom-
plishing changes in societal attitudes, serious constitutional questions
arise.
A fundamental principle in American society is that the grant of
governmental power from the states to the federal government is limited
to the extent necessary to maintain a free society. The fourteenth amend-
ment and the bill of rights, for example, require state action in order to
hold institutions and individuals accountable to government
standards. 10 1
Under Grove City's federal financial assistance standard, however,
the state action requirement is effectively circumvented. Given the per-
vasiveness of current federal spending, the spending powers then become
an extremely powerful jurisdictional weapon with which to manipulate
society to the detriment of individual constitutional rights. 102 Faced with
97. Id. at 1221-22, passim.
98. Hearings on the Civil Rights Policy in Grove City before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (statement of Clarence Pendle-
ton, Chairman, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights).
99. See generally, Czapanskiy, Grove City College v. Bell. Touchdown or Touchback?, 43 MD.
L. REV. 379, 409 (1984).
100. Cf., Frank, A Return to Sex Bias? Title IX Ruling Raises Fears on Both Sides, 70 A.B.A. J.
26 (Aug. 1984).
101. See e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
102. Senator Packwood thus commented on the urgency of overruling the Grove City decision
based on the repercussions the decision might have on several other major federal spending statutes.
"But even more horrifying than Grove City's Title IX interpretation is the decision's staggering
legacy. Not only has the Supreme Court substantially undercut the efficacy of Title IX, but the
decision's precedential value with respect to Title VI, section 504, and the Age Discrimination Act
cannot be overstated." 131 CoNG. REC. S. 1309 (1985) (statement of Senator Packwood).
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the prospect of authorizing unlimited federal government control via fed-
eral financial assistance, the court tempered such an outcome with a nar-
row construction of program-specificity.
GROVE CITY'S IMPACT
The Supreme Court has held that the freedom of a private university
to make its own judgments in educational matters should be a special
constitutional concern.° 3 In particular, there may be unique interests of
private education that are seriously jeopardized by government interven-
tion. Private colleges and universities have historically been free to em-
phasize, if they wished, individualistic patterns of thought, social action,
or political or religious activity. 0 4 Yet forcing these private colleges to
conform to so-called public standards may ultimately produce a "homog-
enous, value-neutral, government-dominated network of colleges."' 10 5
Permitting the federal government to trace any of its federal dollars to a
school's treasury, could erase any meaningful distinctions between pri-
vate and public education.
The duty of the federal government is to ensure that public funds
are spent for their authorized purpose. Implicit in this duty is the re-
sponsibility to ensure that federal funds are not spent to further discrimi-
nation or any other unlawful activity. Nevertheless, when federal
spending powers are used to "promote the general welfare" by dictating
prospective social and moral attitudes, they are no longer remedying per-
ceived social ills. '0 6 Consequently, there is the ever-present temptation to
103. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (Powell, J.). See
also, Note, Academic Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring, 92 HARV. L. REV. 879
(1979).
104. Roche, A View of Education in America, 1 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL'Y 27, 53 (1978);
Oaks, A Private University Looks at Government Regulations, 4 J. C. & U.L. 1 (1976). Many stu-
dents and parents are, of course, willing to make substantial financial sacrifices to obtain a private
education.
105. Hearings on the Civil Rights Policy in Grove City before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (statement of Charles B. Macken-
zie, President, Grove City College at p. 35).
106. In a recent Wisconsin case, the district court noted that:
"Remedy" is something of a misnomer. Cutting off funds does nothing to make victims of
discrimination whole. Except as a general deterrent mechanism, it does not curtail ongo-
ing discrimination. Unlike punitive damages, termination bestows no tangible reward on
individual victims. If remedial, it is only in the sense that termination removes the evil of
providing government funds to discriminatory programs. From this perspective, members
of the national community have equal interest. If victims' lawsuits could trigger termina-
tion, victims of discrimination might be better able to induce discriminators to cease dis-
crimination and to make victims whole, but labelling termination a "remedy" stretches the
concept. Nonetheless, like others, I will speak of termination as a remedy.
Storey v. Board of Regents of University of Wisconsin System, 604 F. Supp. 1200, 1201 n.1 (W.D.
Wis. 1985) (holding that an alleged victim could not obtain termination of federal funds to state
university as a remedy under Title IX).
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misuse the potent coercive effects of the spending powers through unrea-
sonable and ambiguous spending conditions. For example, federal condi-
tions on spending could be used to impermissibly chill the rights of those
who administer or attend small colleges which nurture religious values,
even if the institutions are not "controlled" by any particular religious
group. 107
Not surprisingly, independent private educational institutions, such
as Hillsdale College, have felt the immediate impact of the Grove City
decision. Given the choice between autonomy or federal aid to a portion
of its students, Hillsdale College has announced that it will end all fed-
eral financial aid participation.
0 8
The precedential value of the Grove City decision is likely to extend
beyond the education context because "financial assistance" and "pro-
gram or activity" are frequently-used statutory terms. Several courts
have already attempted to apply Grove City's reasoning to non-education
related activities, and have reached inconsistent results.
For example, in United States of America v. Baylor University Medi-
cal Center,0 9 the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) re-
ceived a complaint that Baylor had refused to allow a deaf patient to
bring an interpreter into the hospital to translate pre- and post-operation
discussions with the medical staff. Insisting that Baylor was a recipient
of federal financial assistance, HHS informed Baylor that it was obligated
to comply with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,110 and
demanded that HHS officials be permitted access to the medical center to
investigate the alleged violations.
The court in Baylor compared BEOG's with Medicare/Medicaid
payments and found that the Grove City decision foreclosed any distinc-
tions between direct federal aid to an institution and indirect federal aid
received through the participation of individual beneficiaries in federal
programs."' Therefore, the court required Baylor to comply with Sec-
107. Small, independent colleges and universities, often comprised of students who share many
common values, reflect decisions by their students to exercise their freedom of association rights by
enrolling in such a school. Jensen, Constitutional and Legal Implications of Tuition Tax Credits in
PUBLIC DOLLARS FOR PRIVATE SCHOOLS: THE CASE OF TUITION TAX CREDITS 151-71 (T. James
& H. Levin 1983).
108. Hearings on the Civil Rights Policy in Grove City before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (statement of George Roche,
President, Hillsdale College at pp. 107-10); Roche, A View of Education in America, 1 HARV. J. OF
L. & PUB. POL. 27, 60-61) (1982).
109. 736 F.2d 1039 (5th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 958 (1985).
110. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
111. 736 F.2d at 1046-47. See also, Frazier v. Board of Trustees of Northwest Mississippi Re-
gional Medical Center, 765 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1985) in which the Fifth Circuit held that a private
corporation which provided respiratory care for the Medical Center was a recipient of federal finan-
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tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act because it was a "recipient" of federal
financial assistance-even though the plaintiff was not a Medicare pa-
tient. The scope of the HHS investigation, however, was limited to the
program-specific reach of Section 504; in this case, Baylor's inpatient and
emergency room services."
t 2
Interestingly, the Baylor court defined the bounds of Section 504's
program-specific reach by examining the hospital's accounting state-
ments which detailed the spending of Medicare funds, an approach al-
luded to in the Grove City dissent. 113 Nevertheless, in blind obedience to
the Grove City decision, the Baylor court failed to differentiate between
major medical centers which are not free to "opt out" of the Medicare
system from small private colleges which may be able to reject federal
grant programs.
Another recent case purported to follow Grove City but reached the
opposite result on the federal financial assistance issue. In Neil Jacobson
v. Delta Airlines, Inc."t4 the court held that certain federally regulated
and federally subsidized activities of a private airline were not federal
financial assistance. In that case, a handicapped plaintiff argued that fed-
eral airmail subsidies, federally subsidized air service, and federal licens-
ing and weather and air traffic control services constituted federal
financial assistance to the airline sufficient to require it to comply with
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. Using the broad guidelines set out
in Grove City, the court rejected each of these forms of aid as "federal
financial assistance" and held that the plaintiff's claim was not covered
by the Act."15 The Delta court distinguished federal funds which subsi-
dize an activity from those which merely compensate the private pro-
vider of federally regulated services." 16 The court then characterized the
challenged activities as compensated services and therefore not "federal
financial assistance" under the Act.
While the Grove City decision undermines the autonomy of educa-
tional institutions, these cases demonstrate that it is even more volatile
when courts attempt to impose its reasoning on other activities which
happen to receive federal dollars. Although the Court in Grove City
cial assistance under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, by virtue of its eventual receipt of Medi-
care/Medicaid funds. Id. at 1291.
112. Id. at 1050.
113. 104 S. Ct. at 1235 n.13. The dissent would seem to discourage an approach which reduced
the financial assistance issue to an analysis of an institution's accounting statements. Instead, the
dissent suggests that the court should look at the general effects of a federal grant to see to what
extent the institution is benefited. Id.
114. 742 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1984).
115. Id. at 1209-15.
116. Id. at 1209. But see, Frazier v. Bd. of Trustees, supra n.l 10.
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stated that its treatment of educational benefits was sui generis, the Bay-
lor and Delta cases show that the reasoning process employed by the
Grove City Court may be used to determine federal control over other
domains of private activity.' 
17
The effects of the Grove City decision have stirred a response in the
legislative branch as well. After Grove City, Congress hastily spawned
legislation to "limit" its effects. 1 8 Legislators raised concerns about at
least three other federal statutes which contain the same program-specific
enforcement provisions as Title IX.119 Though purportedly designed to
return civil rights laws to pre-Grove City status, at least one bill 20 prom-
ised to do much more by extending the definition of "program or activ-
ity" to include entire institutions rather than simply the specific sub-units
which receive the federal aid. 12' Moreover, rather than dealing only with
Title IX, the proposed Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1985 also ex-
panded the program-specific definition in Title VI, section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act, and the Age Discrimination Act. 122
117. Nearly 25% of the gross national product (GNP) is spent by the government after it has
been taxed away from the populace. Ofc. of Mgmt. & Budget of the United States Government-
F.Y. 1986, Historical Tables at 1.2(l)(2), 1.3(l)(2). U.S. Gov't Prtg. Ofc. 1985, GPO No. S/N 041-
001-00288-0 (Total federal government expenditures for 1985 were estimated at 24.8% of the GNP.
Keynesian economists insist this process stimulates the economy. J.M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, & MONEY (1936). However, this "economic" process func-
tions to stimulate federal power when dollars are vested with the prescriptive force of law.
118. See, H.R. 5011, H.R. 5490, S. 2363, S. 2412, S. 2568, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). None of
the proposed bills were enacted by the 98th Congress. Similar legislation, however, has been intro-
duced in the 99th Congress, see S. 272, S. 431, H.R. 700, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
119. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982) (in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone,
104 S. Ct. 1248, 1255 (1984), the Court held that § 504 of the Act is program-specific); Age Discrim-
ination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (1982), Pub. L. No. 94-135, 89 Stat. 728 (1980); Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1982), Pub. L. NO. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (1974).
120. S. 431, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), Sec. 2.
121. See also, S. 431, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., §§ 3, 4, and 5, which similarly were to amend three
other statutes listed supra note 118. The Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1985 designated three
standards for determining coverage under the four statutes:
1. When a state or local government agency or department receives Federal funds, the
entire agency or department is covered.
2. When a university, higher education system, local education agency, or other elemen-
tary and secondary school system receives Federal funds, the entire entity is covered.
3. When a corporation, partnership, or other private organization receives Federal funds,
the entire entity is covered.
131 CONG. REC. S. 1304 (1985) (statement of Senator Weicker).
As noted earlier, if there had been any pre-Grove City consensus, it would more likely be a
program-specific approach that governed only institutional sub-units. See supra note 41.
122. Although Grove City did not explicitly address the impact of its program-specific holding on
any other statutes other than Title IX, legislators nonetheless contended that the statutory reversal
of the Grove City program-specific holding also required them to amend similar provisions in the Age
Discrimination Act, Rehabilitation Act, and Civil Rights Act. Frank, A Return to Sex Bias? Title
IX Ruling Raises Fears on Both Sides, 70 A.B.A. J. 26, 27 (Aug. 1984). A second proposed legisla-
tive response to Grove City called for institution-wide coverage of only educational institutions. 131
Cong. Rec. S. 272 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (statement of Carol Dinkins, Attorney General).
Although this apparent legislative compromise would have granted educational aid recipients unex-
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No legislative result can be predicted with certainty. Nevertheless,
any approach that rests on the assumption that federal spending powers
can be used to circumvent state action and actual discrimination require-
ments in civil rights enforcement cases must be closely scrutinized.
While the Grove City Court blithely stated that Grove City College was
free to "opt out" of the BEOG program if it was unwilling to accept the
Title IX restrictions, as the federal government continues to weave more
strings around federal money, many private entities may not be permit-
ted to refuse the federal funds. For instance, even if a grocer could sur-
vive without the business of food stamp and welfare recipients, he might
be found to be impermissibly discriminating against poor people if he
refused to deal with federal aid recipients. t23 Thus, as "federally funded
activity" becomes more broadly construed, the unsuspecting participant
will be caught between the prerogatives of federal bureaucratic control
and the constitutional rights of those on the receiving end of government
money.
CONCLUSION
The Court's logic in Grove City compels the punishment of the stu-
dent who receives the BEOG by limiting the choice of schools to those
institutions willing to carry out the government's wishes. Moreover, it
allows student aid termination in the complete absence of institutionally-
inflicted discrimination. Yet the execution by the institution of an assur-
ance of compliance form is no guarantee that the institution will not dis-
criminate, any more than the nonexecution of the form is an indication
that the school is discriminating. Therefore, no injustice was done to the
BEOG recipient by Grove City College's refusal to sign the assurance of
compliance, just as no injustice is remedied when the Department of Ed-
ucation terminates the student's grant.
With the help of the program-specific provisions in Title IX, the
Court salvaged some semblance of reasonable limitations on the federal
spending powers. Nevertheless, Grove City's expansive definition of fed-
plained preferential civil rights status, it is foreseeable that despite the limitation of its coverage to
educational institutions such coverage would eventually become a basis for expansive interpretations
as broad as the first legislative approach. ("If Title IX is program-specific in effect, the other stat-
utes, worded identically, are likely to suffer a similar analysis. Indeed, in the past year since the
Court handed down its decision, the Department of Justice has moved forward on that basis in its
so-called enforcement endeavors." 131 CONG. REC. S. 1309 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1985) (statement of
Senator Packwood).
123. Beside poverty being an impermissible classification, great numbers of welfare recipients are
members of minority groups. Therefore, refusing to do business with federally-tainted money would
be tantamount to refusing to do business with minorities in violation of the 13th and 14th
amendments.
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eral financial assistance is, in effect, another step toward limiting the au-
tonomy of private entities through further federal government
encroachments. The Grove City outcome demonstrates the truth today of
nineteenth century historian and social commentator Alexis de Toc-
queville's summation: "A great many persons .. .are quite contented
with this sort of compromise between administrative despotism and the
sovereignty of the people; and they think they have done enough for the
protection of individual freedom when they have surrendered it to the
power of the nation at large."
'124
124. A. DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 337-38 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
